Abstract：We propose two general equilibrium models, quota equilibrium and emission tax equilibrium. Government specifies quotas or taxes on emissions, then refrains from further action. All results remain valid regardless of how government chooses its emissions target. Quota equilibrium exists; the allocation of emission property rights  impacts the distribution of welfare. If the only externality arises from total net emissions, quota equilibrium is Pareto optimal among all feasible outcomes with the same total net emissions. For certain tax rates, emission tax equilibrium may not exist. Every quota equilibrium can be realized as an emission tax equilibrium and vice versa. However, different quota prices may arise in equilibrium from a single quota, and different emission levels may arise in equilibrium from a single tax rate. This leads to inequivalence between quota and emission tax equilibria.

Bio: 端木昊随现为哈尔滨工业大学数学研究院教授，他于2018年在加拿大多伦多大学取得统计学博士学位，于2018-2021年在加州大学伯克利分校从事博士后研究，于2021年加入哈尔滨工业大学数学研究院任教授。他的研究方向包括非标准分析，马尔科夫链，统计决策理论及数理经济学。他的主要研究工作发表于Econometrica, Memoirs of the AMS, Annals of Statistics, Journal of Economic Theory, Biometrika 等国际一流数学，统计和经济学刊物。